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Abstract—Network slicing is a technique widely used in 5G
networks where multiple logical networks (i.e., slices) run over a
single shared physical infrastructure. Each slice may realize one
or multiple services, whose specific requirements are negotiated
beforehand and regulated through Service Level Agreements
(SLAs). In Beyond 5G (B5G) networks it is envisioned that
slices should be created, deployed, and managed in an automated
fashion (i.e., without human intervention) irrespective of the
technological and administrative domains over which a slice
may span. Achieving this vision requires a combination of novel
physical layer technologies, artificial intelligence tools, standard
interfaces, network function virtualization, and software-defined
networking principles. This paper provides an overview of the
challenges facing network slicing automation with a focus on
transport networks. Results from a selected group of use cases
show the benefits of applying conventional optimization tools and
machine-learning-based techniques while addressing some slicing
design and provisioning problems.
Index Terms—Network slicing, Automation, Machine learning,
Beyond 5G
I. INTRODUCTION
5G is entering the early deployment phase. It will support
an unprecedented number of services (e.g., enhanced Mobile
Broadband (eMBB), massive Machine Type Communication
(mMTC), and Ultra Reliable and Low Latency Communica-
tion (URLLC)). Network slicing allows the provisioning of
these different services over a common physical infrastruc-
ture. It creates end-to-end logical networks (i.e., the slices)
by assigning virtual and/or physical resources to different
slices with the guarantee that the performance requirements
of specific service are met [1].
An example of a typical architecture leveraging on the
slicing concept is presented in Fig. 1. It comprises several
technological and/or administrative domains in a hierarchical
manner [2]. Data plane resources are controlled and monitored
by domain-specific controllers (i.e., one for each domain).
On top of them, one or more orchestration layers act to
provide multi-domain, end-to-end services. Once a service
provider requests a slice, the orchestration layer decides if
the request can be satisfied by the network. If a slice is
admitted, a proper set of resources has to be assigned to
meet the Service Level Agreements (SLAs). While the net-
work is in operation, telemetry information is gathered and
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Fig. 1: Example of a hierarchical architecture for 5G network
slicing.
exchanged between the data and the control plane to monitor
the state of resources and services currently running in the
network. In this process, domain-specific information must
be abstracted and exchanged through standard or proprietary
communication protocols. Thanks to this data, the control
and orchestration layers (equipped with the right tools) are
then able to adapt to traffic changes (e.g., scale up or down
slices), to detect potential faults/security breaches, and to
take proper countermeasures. The entire process needs to be
reliable, secure and autonomous, to reduce as much as possible
human intervention. This, in turn, is one of the cornerstones
of Beyond 5G (B5G) networks that aim at creating automated
and trustworthy network environments [3].
In this paper, we highlight the progress and main challenges
in achieving a fully automated slice deployment. While the
network slicing concept can be applied to all technological
domains, we primarily focus on the transport network re-
sources. Selected results show how different algorithms based
on machine learning can be used in slice admission control and
attack detection, and how different levels of reliability impact
the backup resources to be provisioned in a URLLC scenario.
II. STATE OF THE ART AND CHALLENGES
The section summarizes the state of the art on network slic-
ing. Each subsection focuses on a specific topic highlighting
what it has been accomplished and what are still the open
questions that need to be addressed.
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A. Transport Network Slicing and Technologies
When looking at transport networks, slicing techniques
should support services with different requirements (e.g., in
terms of data rates and delay) while differentiating the traffic
flowing in and the resources used by each slice (i.e., isola-
tion). For example, Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs)
or Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) can be used to
tag traffic from different users through labels or IDs or
using other forms of encapsulation [4]. Depending on the
technology used by a specific data plane, other technologies,
such as Flexible Ethernet (FlexE), Optical Transport Network
(OTN), and time/wavelength division multiplexing can be used
to provide stronger isolation while guaranteeing a specific
amount of physical resources for each service [5].
Transport network resources can be sliced in different ways
depending on the use case. For example, a mobile network
provider may need different connectivity services depending
on which radio splits are used [6]. Physical layer splits may
need hundreds of Gbps of capacity, depending on the antenna
configuration. This, in turn, requires a very high capacity
transport system. Space Division Multiplexing (SDM) tech-
niques can help in this respect allowing to carry high capacity
fronthaul traffic. Spatial different SDM resources (e.g., cores
and modes) can be assigned to different services, enabling
isolation [7].
Splits can be also changed at run-time, depending on the
network conditions (e.g., interference) and resource availabil-
ity [8]. The adoption of different splits brings strict latency re-
quirements. Some are delay-tolerant, while other split options
are time-critical, calling for time-sensitive and deterministic
transport solutions that can adapt to evolving traffic conditions.
As a result, IEEE recently formed the Time-Sensitive Net-
working (TSN) working group intending to devise solution for
carrying high and low priority traffic together. They propose
to introduce deterministic delay via time synchronization in
Ethernet networks [5]. Conversely, fusion is a different option
effective in inserting best-effort traffic in real-time streams by
adding fixed and bounded delay (and no jitter) to high priority
streams, with no need for time synchronization [9]. Slicing can
be provided with these architectural solutions but studies on
efficient traffic scheduling are still missing.
B. Attacks, Security and Vulnerabilities
A network infrastructure can be attacked to steal sensitive
information and/or to disrupt traffic. This, in turn, requires
encryption, authentication, and integrity check mechanisms to
be put in place. Threats to physical resource, virtual functions,
and software platforms must be quickly discovered and actions
must be taken promptly to avoid service outages [10]. ML-
based techniques can help in finding relationships among
heterogeneous data, where explicit models or complete infor-
mation are not available. However, this requires (i) integration
of ML modules with existing platforms, also offering support
to legacy and current-generation devices, and (ii) proper ML
models that match the specific use case and address the
inaccuracies due to false positives/negatives.
Slice isolation techniques prevent different services to po-
tentially depleting slice resources, or to exhaust common
resources with multiple slices, causing Denial of Service (DoS)
to other subscribers. Distributed DoS attacks may also be
caused by malware on user’s devices, and since they may
be connected to different slices simultaneously, this could
lead to unwanted inter-slice communication [11]. Isolation
is also required to avoid resources assigned to a slice to
be accessed by other slices, especially for privacy reasons
(e.g., personal data stored in a data center). For example,
if a network function (NF) is shared, a violation of the NF
may allow attackers to steal information from different slices
[10]. Isolation of NFs can be done, e.g., at the hardware level,
the virtual machine, or kernel level [12]. Complete isolation
NF is preferable from a security point of view. However,
this usually leads to different dedicated networks with very
low multiplexing gains. Since slices with different security
requirements must be provided on the same infrastructure,
additional studies are required to investigate how to provide
the proper level of isolation, depending on the specific service.
Network virtualization and softwarization introduce also
several vulnerabilities to attacks [13] [14]. The separation of
the control and the data plane exposes the network to potential
attacks. Management interfaces between network entities must
be secured to avoid impersonation of slice managers, which
may lead to theft of sensitive information, creation/termination
of slice instances and other unauthorized activities. A breach
of data plane functions could also result in a control plane
violation [11]. Even though sensitive data can be encrypted,
side channels attacks, where an attacker collects information
that is usually exchanged in the clear (e.g., metadata), can
be conducted. These data could be used, for example, to
induce faults or tamper with the system cache [11]. All
these aspects must be studied in the context of 5G and B5G
frameworks. The delay and computational effort introduced
by different levels of encryption may impact the slice design
and require additional studies. The most appropriate level of
security countermeasures must be investigated, depending on
the service type.
Transport network slices may also be affected by physical
layer attacks, e.g., via signal jamming or external polarization
modulation. In- or out-of-band jamming can significantly
degrade signals, both wireless or wired, or may target control
channels, resulting in a denial of access for selected users
[15], [16]. Polarization modulation attacks in fibers induce
demultiplexing errors [16]. Techniques to detect and mitigate
the errors induced by these attacks must be provided. Different
ML-based techniques can be employed to detect and classify
attacks or find anomalies in optical networks, requiring access
to data at different control and orchestration levels [17].
Approaches based on hierarchical learning can be applied in
multi-domain scenarios to hide domain-specific information
[18]. However, this requires to study accurate abstraction
policies to avoid the effects of error propagation while keeping
reasonable scalability performance. In addition, ML models
also present inherent inaccuracy, especially when new data
are introduced. To compensate, error mitigation techniques can
be considered, e.g., by combining multiple ML models. This
requires finding a trade-off among model complexity, accuracy,
and time needed to compute the solution (including training).
C. Optimal Resource Allocation Strategies
Upon acceptance, a slice needs to be mapped into the
network infrastructure. In turn, this becomes an optimization
problem where only the right amount of network resources
should be provided while guaranteeing the performance level
required by a specific service. Otherwise, overprovisioning of
resources might lead to an increased slice rejection rate or to
service degradation, with an obvious impact on the revenue of
the service/infrastructure provider.
Slice resource mapping can be seen as an extension to the
well studied Virtual Network Embedding (VNE) problem [19].
More specifically, VNE finds (i) the optimal placement of
NF and (2) the best allocation of the virtual link capacity
required to interconnect the NFs. The solution to a slice
resource mapping problem might also have to identify the
most appropriate data plane technology to be used as well
as a proper set of backup resources (local vs. end-to-end,
dedicated vs. shared) to support the required level of resiliency
in the presence of failures [20]–[22]. In some cases, only
specific functions or paths within a single slice need to be
protected, requiring additional resources to be provided as a
backup. In other cases, with extreme reliability requirements,
backup resources must be provisioned in a 1+1 or 1:1 manner.
When the problem becomes very complex, game-theoretic
approaches can be used to consider the relationship among
users, network operators, and service providers, to formulate
optimization problems. Examples are the fairness of network
resource allocation, profit maximization, and cost minimiza-
tion of network slice’s users [23].
It should be noted that the slice resources requirement pro-
file may change over time (e.g., users might behave differently
at a different time of day) and a mere peak-based resource
assignment could result in low service acceptance. This calls
for strategies aimed at reconfiguring slices over time. As a
result, there are approaches in the literature that support the
scaling up/down of slices at run-time based on the level of
utilization of the network resources [24]. Another example of
slice adaption is the possibility to vary the choice of baseband
splits over time, while the slice is in operation. This approach
helps to achieve better resource utilization and to reduce the
transport network load. However, this may require frequent
reconfigurations to pursue cost minimization and therefore
trade-offs must be derived [25]. Prediction models can be also
be adopted to forecast network changes and take actions on
the network resources in advance. These aspects are analyzed
in the next section.
D. Slice Management and Orchestration
In the most general case slices might span across multiple
administrative domains while combining resources belonging
to different technological domains. This calls for the de-
velopment of a standard way to exchange information and
interactions among different providers and domains, to ensure
that SLAs are met. Also, an appropriate set of data must be
selected and sent to the orchestration layer to (i) solve the slice
admission and mapping problems in an optimal way and (ii)
to be able to continuously monitor the SLAs during the slice
lifecycle.
Establishing a multi-domain slice leverages on the principle
of recursive virtualization and hierarchical network abstraction
[26]. The network resources allocated to a particular tenant
can be abstracted and exposed to a third party that can
construct a new service on top of the prior one. This approach
simplifies the composition of slices allowing a combination
of different resources in a flexible way. Upon the arrival of a
slice request, the service orchestration layer decides whether to
admit the slice or not. This process involves the identification
of the domains to be involved. Then, the slice request must
be converted into directives for the different domains, that
must select the most appropriate set of resources. This can be
done using an intent-based networking paradigm, which allows
expressing slice requirements and constraints in the form of
policies [27]. Each domain is also responsible for providing
monitoring data throughout the slice life-cycle. Data from
different domains are collected and elaborated by the service
orchestration layer to monitor SLAs and take the necessary
actions. The interactions among these entities can be based on
a peer to peer approach or a federated infrastructure domain
[2]. In the former, orchestrators of different domains interact
to find a solution that satisfies specific SLA. In the latter,
a common cross-domain slice coordinator leverages trusted
connectivity across administrative domains and carries out
domain-specific resource allocation.
In terms of challenges, end-to-end management and or-
chestration frameworks require the implementation of specific
functionalities to reach complete automation. Slice deployment
should be autonomous, requiring automatic acceptance or
denial of slice requests, based on the network resources and
service requirements. The network control should also be able
to continuously monitor the state of the resources to adapt the
slice mapping to the evolving network conditions, i.e., to be
able to re-configure itself. This is required, for example in the
case of traffic variarion and/failures. All this must work when
slices traverse different technological and/or administrative
domains, requiring to elaborate and expose information among
the different entities in a common, standard way.
Artificial intelligence (AI) allows the creation of systems
that autonomously take decisions based on their perceived
environment. To do so, information must be collected from
the network, where equipment of different suppliers co-exists,
requiring the definition of common standard interfaces to
create vendor-agnostic monitoring systems [28]. Moreover,
telemetry information can be exploited for proactive or reactive
network re-configurations. Different models can be used to
obtain information about the physical layer and trigger changes
at the network level, e.g., in routing, spectrum and modulation
assignments [29]. These data can also be used to estimate
the traffic and take appropriate actions [30], i.e., triggering
reconfiguration strategies to change the current slice resource
assignment and avoid SLA violation or slice request rejection
[28] [31]. Even though these approaches are effective, further
analysis of the computational effort and performance of these
strategies, as well as the amount of data to be collected and
elaborated in real-size scenarios require further studies.
Finally, from the standardization point of view efforts are
needed to enhance current information models to account for
multi-domain connectivity and control, resiliency and perfor-
mance measurements, as well as multi-domain intent-based
networking interfaces. From a resource abstraction point of
view, the functions and connectivity resources to be exposed
impact the end-to-end network performance and cost. Finally,
security aspects are yet to be considered in multi-domain
scenarios, e.g., how to guarantee authorization, integrity, and
encryption among different players.
III. BENEFITS OF AUTOMATION: A FEW RESULTS
This section reports a number of selected results while
addressing some of the challenges described above. The use
cases under exam include: slice admission control, optimal
URLLC slice deployment strategies, and application of ML-
based method to address security problems.
A. Intelligent Slice Admission Control
Different strategies based on ML can be employed in the
slice admission process. For example, reinforcement learning
(RL) strategies can be used to make scheduling decisions
based on the feedback derived from past actions. Another
possibility is to use supervised learning methods to derive
traffic predictions (TP) to be used to get insight into future
resource needs.
The work in [31] reports a comparison of the two ap-
proaches. In RL, the inputs for the neural network are the value
of the service holding time, the number of required resources
and the current status of the infrastructure. The output of the
neural network indicates the best service in the queue to be
provisioned. The reward function is proportional to the sum
of the penalties associated with the services currently waiting
in the buffer and to the ones currently being provisioned
in the infrastructure. At each training iteration, to minimize
the value of the reward function, the discounted reward is
computed and a policy network is optimized using the gradient
descent method. The TP-based heuristic provisions a service
with the help of a regression-based TP function that estimates
the resources required by each one of the services included
within the prediction window τ . A TP-based heuristic checks
each service in the queue and selects the service for which
(i) enough resources are available, and (ii) its provisioning
generates the lowest penalty as compared to selecting other
services in the buffer. Each service expected to be requested
within τ is provisioned if the penalty incurred by the services
within τ when the service is provisioned is greater than the
same penalty when the service is not provisioned. Otherwise,
the service is held in the queue.
Two different kinds of services are considered. A mobile
service provider (MSP) requires the activation of up to 3
small cells, each requiring a dedicated wavelength, and a
total service capacity of up to 4 CPUs in a data center, for




















0 10 20 30




















TP  = 1
TP  = 3
TP  = 5
(b)
Fig. 2: Comparison of average penalty for RL, Random, Best
Fit, and MaxRev (a), and RL vs. TP for different prediction
windows τ and prediction errors ε (b).
a duration of up to 3 time steps. A cloud service provider
(CSP) requires services with up to 2 wavelengths and 4 CPUs
each, for a duration of [10, 15] time steps. All these variables
are randomly selected using independent uniform distributions.
80% of all the services are MSP, while 20% are CSP. The
infrastructure provider pays a penalty proportional to the delay
(i.e., measured in time steps) in provisioning a service. The
penalty coefficient of the MSP services is five times bigger
than the one of the CSP services. More details are available
in [31].
Fig. 2a shows how the RL is able to reduce the penalty
factor with respect to three benchmarks: (i) Random, that
selects which service to provision with a uniform probability,
(ii) Best Fit, that selects the service that fits best the available
resources, and (iii) Maximum Revenue (MaxRev), that pri-
oritizes MSP services over the CSP ones. In the beginning,
the RL performs similarly to the Random strategy. When
the number of iterations increases, RL learns that it is more
beneficial to serve MSP over CSP services to keep the penalty
factor low. Fig. 2b compares the performance of RL with the
TP-based heuristic for different prediction windows. It shows
that when τ = 1, the performance of RL is always better
regardless of the value of the prediction error ε. For low values
of ε, larger prediction windows allow TP to outperform RL
by up to 6% and 10% in case of τ = 3 and 5, respectively.
However, if ε is large (i.e., > 20%), there is no gain in using
a TP-based heuristic.
B. Optimal URLLC Service Slice Deployment
Network failures impact the operation with consequences on
the service provisioning. Among all the services envisioned for
5G, URLLC are the most critical ones. The deployment of a
URLLC service slice requires provisioning of radio, transport
and cloud resources. In addition, provisioning of additional
backup resources must be considered, to be used in case
of failures. Backup resources can be dedicated or shared,
depending on the specific requirement, whereas in the latter
case some time is needed to switch to the backup resources
when a failure is detected.
TABLE I: Active nodes and capacity savings for 6 node
network in the balanced and unbalanced cases under 2 and
3 hop constraints. The unconstrained case relaxes limitations
on the network resources and delay.
Active nodes Saved
Network DPP SPP Capacity
2 hops - bal 6 4 66.6%
3 hops - bal 6 4 66.6%
2 hops - unbal 4 4 23.6%
3 hops - unbal 4 4 27.8%
Unconstrained 2 2 0%
Two different ILP models are presented in [22] comparing
the outcome of dedicated and shared backup path protection
(DPP and SPP, respectively). Both strategies allow to select
the best baseband split depending on the available network
resources while providing resiliency against a single node or
link failure. The objective of these strategies is to minimize
the number of nodes where to install cloud resources and the
amount of resources to be provisioned. Numerical results are
obtained considering the deployment of a URLLC slice in
a 6 node network, under different conditions. Two different
resource distributions are considered. In the balanced case,
all the nodes have the same capacity (25 processing units -
PUs). In the unbalanced case, two nodes are assumed to have
unlimited resources, while other nodes have limited capacity
(10 PUs). All the links have the same and limited capacity (40
Gbps). More details are available in [22].
Table I shows the number of nodes selected to host either
baseband, core or cloud functions (referred to as active nodes)
and the saved backup computational capacity when SPP is
used, with respect to the DPP, in the sample network. The
unconstrained case, reported as a benchmark, provides a
lower bound for the number of active nodes, that is the case
when no constraints on capacity, bandwidth, and latency are
applied. Since this case requires only 2 nodes, it also exhibits
no backup resource sharing. In real case scenarios, when
resources are limited, the number of nodes increases due to
finite node and link capacity. This situation is evaluated under
two different delay constraints (2 and 3 hops). In the balanced
case, sharing backup resources leads to a reduction in the
number of nodes to be activated, regardless of the number
of hops. This is due to the sharing of backup resources in
both links and nodes, that allows reducing the backup capacity
by 66.6%. In the unbalanced case instead, where some nodes
provide extensive capacity, the SPP is still effective in sharing
backup capacity with a reduction of up to 27.8%.
C. Machine Learning in Optical Network Security
Attacks targeting the physical layer of optical networks can
cause service outages involving one or more slices, depending
on the level of resource sharing and isolation. Different attacks
can cause optical parameters to deviate from regular operating
conditions. Existing models of physical layer impairments are
too simplistic to capture the complex effects of a range of
attacks [17]. Instead, ML techniques have found a useful
application in identifying intricate patterns among different
parameters. Supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised
learning techniques can be used to identify security breaches
by jointly analyzing multiple monitoring parameters. Super-
vised learning models can be trained to learn the trends
in optical performance indicators that characterize different
attacks and normal working conditions, potentially providing
fine-granular classification of the attack type and intensity,
depending on the training set. However, it is not easy to
provide a representative and precise set of correctly labeled
data for a continuously evolving attack landscape. Under such
circumstances, semi-supervised learning models can be used
for detecting the presence of an attack even if it is previously
unseen, but without the ability to categorize it. This is obtained
through training using only the data from normal operating
conditions. Unsupervised learning models can be used to
detect attack presence in the network in circumstances when
no training data is available. These three techniques exhibit
different requirements in terms of data acquisition before their
use, in addition to different levels of performance obtained
during their use. Depending on the considered scenario, the
most appropriate technique to be used needs to be carefully
evaluated.
In the following, we consider a real test-bed subject to
physical-layer attacks described in [16]. Three different at-
tacks have been considered: in- and out-of-band jamming,
and external polarization modulation. The first two attacks
consist in inserting harmful signals generated by a continuous
wave laser into a breached fiber, propagating in the same
or in an adjacent optical channel as the channel under test.
Polarization modulation, instead, is performed by squeezing
the fiber with a modulator driven by a sine-wave generator,
inducing changes in the state of polarization that are too fast
for the coherent receiver to compensate for, which results
in erroneous detection. Twelve different Optical Performance
Monitoring (OPM) parameters are collected from the network.
Three different models have been used for attack detection: (i)
a supervised learning model using Artificial Neural Network
(ANN), (ii) a semi-supervised learning model using One-Class
Support Vector Machine (OCSVM), and (iii) an unsupervised
learning model using Density-Based Spatial Clustering of
Applications (DBSCAN). The results are summarized in Table
II, where the false positive and negative rates, and the f1
score are reported for each model. The ANN is always capable
of detecting the attacks although sometimes it might classify
them in the wrong attack category. In the semi-supervised and
unsupervised models, instead, there is a probability that an
attack will remain undetected (false negative) and a probability
that a normal operating condition is flagged as an attack (false
positive). The f1 score is a measure that considers both false
positive and negative rates providing a unified accuracy metric.
In the case of OCSVM and DBSCAN, the false positive rate
is 0.029 and 0.062, respectively, while the false negative rate
is 0.003 and 0, respectively. In case of ANN, the f1 score
is 1, as it is able to detect all attacks, while in case of
OCSVM and DBSCAN it is lower. In particular, the OCSVM
provides very good performance with a score of 0.985, while
for the DBSCAN the score is 0.970. These results indicate
TABLE II: Comparison of the performance for different ML
models showing false positive and negative rate, and f1 score.
ML model False positive rate False negative rate f1 score
ANN 0 0 1
OCSVM 0.029 0.003 0.985
DBSCAN 0.062 0 0.970
that, in the considered scenario, the lower the data acquisition
overhead, the larger is the error provided by the solution.
Depending on the specific case, techniques aimed at improving
the performance of unsupervised and semi-supervised learning
can be adopted. For example, a time window based approach
allows to trigger countermeasures if the attack is detected in
several of consecutive samples, which reduces the probability
of false alarms or attack misdetection over the window at
the expense of introducing some delay in the attack detection
process.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents an overview of the work currently
underway to address a number of challenges in the area of
transport network slicing. The paper also elaborate on the
main challenges to that needs to be addressed to reach a
fully automated slice deployment scenario, one of the key
features for beyond 5G networks. Results on a number of
selected use cases show how different algorithms based on
machine learning can be used in slice admission control
and attack detection, and how different levels of reliability
impact the backup resources to be provisioned in a URLLC
scenario. The discussion of the main challenges suggests
that several aspects remain unexplored. Resource assignment
and re-allocation techniques in dynamic scenarios must be
studied, especially with novel equipment supporting time-
sensitive networking. In addition, multi-domain orchestration
frameworks still lack a standardized way to communicate with
other domain orchestrators. Proper data sets to be exchanged in
this view (e.g., monitoring parameters or abstracted resources)
as well as the impact on the network performance require
additional investigation. Also, artificial intelligence is indeed
a powerful tool towards secure and autonomous networks, but
still lacks a deeper scalability analysis.
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